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Abstract
We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase in-
formation about the opponents’ actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be
bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by
a player. For our main result, we make the usual assumption that the dimension of the set
FIR of feasible and individually rational payoﬀ vectors is equal to the number of players.
We show that, if there are at least three players and each player has at least four actions,
then every payoﬀ vector in the interior of the set FIR can be achieved by a Nash equilibrium
of the discounted repeated game if the discount factor is suﬃciently close to 1. Therefore,
nearly eﬃcient payoﬀs can be achieved even if the cost of monitoring is high. We show that
the same result holds if there are at least four players and at least three actions for each
player. Finally, we indicate how the construction can be extended to sequential equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
The Folk Theorem in repeated games states that, if players can perfectly and costlessly observe
the opponents’ past actions, and evaluate payoﬀ streams by means of the limiting average
criterion, then every feasible and individually rational payoﬀ vector of the stage game can
be obtained by a Nash equilibrium in the repeated game (see Aumann and Shapley (1994)).
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) extended this result to the discounted case under the condition
that the dimension of the set FIR of feasible and individually rational payoﬀ vectors is equal
to the number of players (for later reference, we call this the full dimensionality condition1).
The proofs heavily rely on the assumption that information about the opponents’ behavior can
be obtained costlessly. Recently, there has been a growing interest in models of discounted
repeated games in which such information is no longer costless. See, for instance, Ben-Porath
and Kahneman (2003), Miyagawa, Miyahara and Sekiguchi (2004) and Kandori and Obara
(2004). These papers all study models in which players can voluntarily monitor the actions of a
group of opponents at the current stage. They diﬀer, however, on many assumptions regarding
the number of players, the quality of monitoring, the information that players receive if they do
not monitor, the availability of costless public messages, and other aspects.
Our paper comes closest to Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) (BPK hereafter) in terms
of the model, the results and the construction used to prove the result, but also bears some
resemblance with Miyagawa, Miyahara and Sekiguchi (2004) (MMS from now on). For this
reason, we will compare our construction with BPK and MMS throughout this paper.
In our paper, we analyze infinitely repeated games with discounting in which purchasing
information about opponents’ actions is voluntary but costly. More precisely, at the beginning
of every stage a player can choose a subset of past stages at which he wants to buy information.
For each stage he wishes to buy, he must pay a fixed amount c > 0, and will observe the actions
of every opponent at that stage. The net discounted payoﬀ for a player is given by his usual
expected discounted payoﬀ, minus the expected discounted cost of buying information. Our
main result is to show that, if full dimensionality holds, the number of players is at least three,
and each of them has at least four actions, then every payoﬀ vector in the interior of FIR can
be supported (in terms of net expected discounted payoﬀs) by a Nash equilibrium, given that
the discount factor is suﬃciently close to 1. Besides, we show that the same result holds if there
are at least four players and at least three actions for each player. We also indicate how the
result can be extended to sequential equilibrium.
Our model diﬀers from BPK and MMS on the following aspects: (1) In our setting, a player
can also purchase information about previous stages, whereas in BPK and MMS a player can
only buy information about the present stage; (2) If a player decides to buy information in our
model, he observes the actions of all opponents, whereas in BPK and MMS a player can choose
the group of opponents which he would like to monitor; (3) In our model and in MMS public
1This condition, which has been widely used, merely rules out degenerate cases.
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announcements are not available, whereas BPK assumes costless public announcements; (4) In
our model and in BPK, a player does not receive any information about the opponents’ actions
unless he buys information. In MMS, even if a player does not buy information he receives
a costless stochastic signal depending on the action profile chosen at the current stage; (5) In
our construction we do not use any public randomization device, in contrast with MMS. In
BPK, such a device is only used to simplify the construction. In conclusion, we would like to
emphasize that we assume no external devices (for public announcements or randomization),
in contrast with other models. This makes the communication and coordination of the players
more troublesome in our context.
All the models above can be applied to several economic environments of interest. Possible
applications include repeated partnership models (see, for instance, Radner (1986) and Radner,
Myerson and Maskin (1986)) or models of collusion between firms (for instance Green and Porter
(1984)).
We shall now provide a motivation for the construction of our Nash equilibria in the repeated
game. Take an arbitrary payoﬀ vector in the interior of FIR. If it cannot be supported by a
convex combination of Nash equilibria of the stage game, then at certain stages players must play
action profiles where at least one of them would have an incentive to deviate in terms of stage
payoﬀs. It is therefore essential that this player will be monitored with positive probability at
such stages. However, in order to give an opponent an incentive to purchase information about
these stages, he must have some uncertainty about the players’ actions there. This may be
achieved by the following delicate construction: Choose a large number n, and a sequence of 2n
pure action profiles such that the corresponding discounted payoﬀ is close to the desired payoﬀ
vector. During a block U of 2n stages, players are to follow these action profiles. However, at
the beginning of U each player chooses a stage at which he will “switch” from the prescribed
action, according to a cleverly chosen probability distribution putting a positive probability on
each of these 2n stages. We will come back to this probability distribution towards the end of
this introduction.
Since every stage in U is chosen with positive probability as a possible switching stage, we
must guarantee that each of these switching stage choices leads to the same expected payoﬀ for
every player. As to achieve this we build in a compensation mechanism by making the future
target payoﬀ dependent on the switching stages chosen and the realized actions at these switching
stages. For this, we let the players report their switching stage after block U, thereby enabling
the opponents to discover all switching stages and the corresponding switching actions. This
means that all realized actions in U will eventually be known to all players. Recall, however, that
public announcements are not available in our setting, which makes the exchange of information
more troublesome. Players must use regular actions to report their switching stages, which can
be discovered by the opponents by purchasing information. We construct after block U a block
I with n stages in which players report their switching stage in binary code. For each player,
two actions are used to code digit “1”, and two other actions are used to code digit “0” (recall
that we assume at least four actions for every player). This way players are able to randomize
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while sending information.
In order to give the players an incentive to buy all stages in I, and subsequently to buy
the reported switching stages, we construct a block C, with only one stage, after I in which
every player must make a report based on the observed actions at the switching stages. By
construction, we make sure that if a player decides not to buy information when he is supposed
to do so, then he will report incorrectly with a positive probability, which would then be detected
by his opponents. Finally, there is a block D, with only one stage, after C in which players can
report whether they have detected a deviation from the prescribed strategy profile. If a deviation
is reported, all players can discover the deviator by purchasing past stages, and this deviator
will be punished for the remainder of the game.
After block D, a new cycle of blocks U, I,C and D will follow, and so on. For the new block
U, a new target payoﬀ vector is chosen based on the observed actions in the previous cycle of
blocks. In the new block C, players must report the actions they observed in the previous blocks
C and D. This is done in order to give the players an incentive to purchase information about
the blocks C and D.
The outline of this paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we
present our main result, and give a detailed outline of the proof. In Section 4 we give the formal
proof for our main result. In Section 5 we give the construction for sequential equilibrium.
Finally, in Section 6 we discuss possible extensions of the main result, and give some concluding
remarks.
2. Model
We consider repeated games in which the same stage game is repeated infinitely often, and
players evaluate payoﬀ streams by means of the same2 discount factor. At every stage, a player
has the opportunity to purchase information about the past actions chosen by his opponents. If
he decides to buy information, he has to pay a fixed price3 for every past stage at which he wants
the opponents’ behavior to be revealed. At a given stage, a player may purchase information
about as many past stages as he likes.
Formally, the stage game is a simultaneous-move game Γs = ((Ai)i∈I , (vi)i∈I), where I =
{1, ...,m} is the finite set of players, Ai is the finite set of pure actions for player i, and vi :
×j∈IAj → R is player i’s payoﬀ function. At every stage t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...} of the repeated game,
player i first chooses a (possibly empty) collection Kti (1) ⊆ {1, 2, ..., t− 1} of past stages about
which he wants to buy information. Subsequently, he observes the opponents’ actions that were
chosen at stages in Kti (1), and depending on this information he may decide to purchase another
collection Kti (2) of past stages not already included in K
t
i (1), and so on, until he does not desire
any further information4. Let K¯ti be the collection of all stages about which player i buys
2Our results would still hold if diﬀerent players would have diﬀerent discount factors.
3We assume that these costs are the same for all players. However, this is not essential for our results.
4Alternatively, we could also assume that players can only buy one collection of past stages at a given stage.
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information at stage t. For each stage he buys, player i must pay a fixed amount c > 0, resulting
in a total cost of cti = c
¯¯
K¯ti
¯¯
. After collecting all this information, player i chooses a pure action
ati ∈ Ai. If every player does so at stage t, this results in an action profile at = (atj)j∈I which
yields every player i a payoﬀ vti = vi(a
t). The infinite sequence ((v1i , c
1
i ), (v
2
i , c
2
i ), ...) of payoﬀs
and costs for player i is evaluated by means of the δ-discounted payoﬀ
uδi = (1− δ)
∞X
t=1
δt−1(vti − cti),
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the common discount factor.
We assume that every player (1) knows the stage game, the price c for information and
the common discount factor, (2) observes his own action5, but does not observe the opponents’
actions at a given stage t unless he buys information about stage t, (3) is unaware of the
information purchase by his opponents at a given stage t, even if he buys information about
stage t, and (4) has perfect recall.
A behavior strategy σi for player i specifies, for every stage and every possible collection of
past actions6 that may have been observed until then, (1) an information purchase as described
above, and, based on this new information, (2) a probability distribution over pure actions. A
collection σ = (σi)i∈I is called a behavior strategy profile, and induces for every player i an
expected δ-discounted payoﬀ uδi (σ).
A behavior strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈I is a Nash equilibrium for discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) if
uδi (σ) = maxσ0i u
δ
i (σ
0
i, σ−i). Here, σ−i is a short way to write (σj)j 6=i. Let E
δ ⊆ RI denote the
set of δ-discounted payoﬀ vectors that correspond to Nash equilibria for the discount factor δ.
LetA = ×i∈IAi be the set of pure action profiles in the stage game Γs. By F = conv{(vi(a))i∈I |
a ∈ A} ⊆ RI we denote the set of feasible payoﬀs in the stage game, where “conv” stands for
“convex hull”. Let
di = min
α−i∈×j 6=i∆(Aj)
max
ai∈Ai
vi(ai, α−i)
be the min-max payoﬀ for player i in the stage game. Here, ∆(Aj) denotes the set of probability
distributions on Aj and vi(ai, α−i) is the expected payoﬀ for player i induced by ai and α−i. By
FIR = {(vi)i∈I ∈ F | vi ≥ di for every i}
There is only one place in our construction where this is relevant, namely in block Ck to be defined below. When
we discuss this block Ck, we will indicate how this block can be modified if only one collection of past stages can
be purchased.
5 In this paper we focus on the case where a player receives no information about the opponents’ actions, unless
he buys information. If one assumes that players can costlessly and perfectly observe their own payoﬀs, then one
has to investigate which actions reveal which other actions. However, our techniques could still be applied to those
situations where the payoﬀ does not completely reveal the opponents’ actions. We remark that in generic games
observing your own payoﬀs would imply full monitoring, in which case the main theorem would hold without any
need to buy additional information (see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)).
6One could also assume that behavior strategies take into account when information purchase took place. For
our purposes it makes no diﬀerence.
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we denote the set of feasible and individually rational payoﬀ vectors in the stage game.
3. Main Result and Detailed Outline of Proof
3.1. Main Result
Take a stage game with a full dimensional FIR, and assume that there are at least three players
and that each player has at least four actions. Our main result is to show that every payoﬀ
vector in the interior of FIR is induced by some equilibrium in the δ-discounted repeated game
if δ is suﬃciently close to 1. In Section 5 we will discuss possible generalizations of this result,
including a construction for sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Let Γs be a stage game with a full dimensional FIR. Assume that there are at
least three players and at least four actions for each player. Then, for every u ∈ int(FIR) there
is some δ(u) ∈ (0, 1) such that u ∈ Eδ for every δ ∈ (δ(u), 1).
Without entering into too much detail here, we would like to clarify the assumptions we
make in our theorem. The reason we assume at least four actions for every player is to enable
the players to communicate through randomizations over actions. We need at least three players
since in our construction it is essential that each player’s actions are monitored by at least two
opponents as to make deviations detectable (see DM2 in Section 3.3).7
Before presenting the formal proof in the following section, we illustrate the main idea by
means of an example. Consider the following three-player stage game:
a2 b2
a1 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
b1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 3
a3
a2 b2
a1 0, 0, 0 3, 0, 0
b1 0, 3, 0 2, 2, 2
b3
Here, player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column and player 3 chooses the matrix.
Assume that every player i has two additional actions a¯i, b¯i which are simply duplicates of ai
and bi (that is, a¯i induces the same payoﬀs as ai against any pair of actions by the opponents,
and similarly for b¯i). Notice that di = 0 for all players i, and that dim(FIR) = 3. Hence, the
conditions of our theorem are met.
Take a payoﬀ vector u in the interior of FIR. We show how to construct an equilibrium for
large enough δ which induces u.
3.2. The Strategy Profile
The first step is to divide the set of stages into “master-blocks” M1,M2, ... of length 2n + n+ 2
(where n is yet to be determined). Master-block M1 is designed in such a way that the realized
7Also BPK treat the case of two players as a special one.
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actions information purchase
Uk
(2n stages)
* choose switching-stage tik ∈ Uk as follows:
last stage in Uk with probability 2n/(2n + c)
all other stages in Uk with equal probability
* at all stages except tik play prescribed pure action
* at stage tik switch to 12 a¯i +
1
2 b¯i
none
Ik
(n stages)
report switching-stage tik in binary code none
Ck
(1 stage)
* play 12ai +
1
2bi if the sum of the number of a’s and
the number of a¯’s at tjk (∀j), Ck−1, Dk−1 is even
* play 12 a¯i +
1
2 b¯i otherwise
* Ik
* tjk for all j 6= i
* Ck−1
* Dk−1
Dk
(1 stage)
* if player i detects a deviation then report
this by playing 12 a¯i +
1
2 b¯i
* play 12ai +
1
2bi otherwise
none
Table 1: Summary of player i’s behavior as long as no player has reported a deviation
payoﬀ-vector in M1 is close to u. Since in M1 the strategy profile does not always prescribe a
fixed action, one cannot guarantee that the realized payoﬀ-vector is exactly equal to u. Master-
block M2 is identical to M1. By construction, at the end of M2 the players will find out the
realized payoﬀs in block M1. Before the start of M3, a new target-payoﬀ-vector u3 has to be
determined as to compensate for the “contaminating” payoﬀs inM1. In general, before the start
of each master-blockMk we determine a target-payoﬀ-vector uk based on the diﬀerence between
uk−2 and the realized payoﬀs in Mk−2. An important step in our construction will be to make
sure that the target-payoﬀ-vector uk suﬃciently stays away from the boundary of FIR. The
reason for not allowing uk to be close to the boundary of FIR is that players must be able to
randomize at certain stages in the construction.
Each master-block Mk consists of four sub-blocks, the “utility-block” Uk (of length 2n), the
“information-exchange-block” Ik (of length n), the “control-block” Ck (of length 1), and the
“deviation-report-block” Dk (of length 1). Table 1 summarizes the players’ behavior in these
four sub-blocks.
Utility-block Uk: This block makes sure that the total discounted payoﬀ-vector converges
to u, as desired. In order to achieve this, the relative length of Uk within the master-block Mk
is chosen close to 1 (by choosing n large enough).
Information purchase: During block Uk no player buys any information yet.
Actions: The prescribed actions here are pure actions in {ai, bi}, and are chosen in such a
way that the induced discounted payoﬀ-vector is close to the target-payoﬀ-vector uk. However,
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every player i chooses a stage in this utility-block in which he “switches” from the prescribed
action to randomizing equally between the two duplicate actions a¯i and b¯i. This switching-stage
is chosen according to the following probability distribution: the last stage in Uk is chosen with
probability 2n/(2n+ c), whereas the other stages are chosen with probability c/(2n− 1)(2n+ c).
Hence, the last stage is chosen with a much larger probability than the other stages in Uk.8
Information-exchange-block Ik: The purpose of Ik is to enable the players to find out
the realization of the switches at Uk.
Information purchase: During block Ik no player buys any information yet.
Actions: Each player must report in binary code the stage in Uk at which he switched. Here,
randomization 12ai+
1
2bi represents 0 and randomization
1
2 a¯i+
1
2 b¯i represents 1 for every player i.
More precisely, if player i in Uk has switched at stage tik, which corresponds to the t˜ik-th stage
within Uk, then he must play the sequence of randomizations in Ik that corresponds to t˜ik − 1
in binary code. Note that n stages are suﬃcient for reporting the binary code, since Uk consists
of 2n stages.9
Control-block Ck: The idea behind Ck is that players check whether opponents have played
the “right” actions, and have bought information whenever they were supposed to.
Information purchase: At the beginning, every player i buys information about all stages
in Ik, which enables him to identify the stages in Uk at which his opponents have switched.
Additionally, player i buys information about these stages in Uk. More precisely, if player i
learns that opponent j1 has reported the switching stage tj1k, and opponent j2 has reported
tj2k, he buys stages tj1k and tj2k in Uk. If the two reported switching stages coincide, he only
buys this stage once. (Note that each player i knows the actions that were played at his own
switching stage tik. Namely, if tik coincides with an opponent’s switching stage, then he must
buy that stage. If, on the other hand, player i is the only player who switched at tik, then he
knows what his opponents were supposed to play there.) Subsequently, player i buys information
about the previous control-block Ck−1 and the previous deviation-report-block Dk−1 (if k ≥ 2).
Actions: Two diﬀerent scenarios may occur here. (a) If no player reported a deviation at
Dk−1 (we will describe later how deviations can be reported): If among all actions at stages tjk
(j = 1, 2, 3), Ck−1 and Dk−1 the sum of the number of a’s and the number of a¯’s is even, then
8 In BPK, a similar block is used to generate a discounted payoﬀ close to the target payoﬀ. A diﬀerence is that
in BPK, every player randomly chooses two switching stages, according to the uniform distribution. Also, in BPK
every player monitors exactly one opponent at a randomly chosen stage. In BPK, namely, buying information
about opponents’ actions cannot be delayed. The monitoring assignment in BPK is quite delicate.
In MMS, the length of Uk is not fixed, but determined stochastically, with the expected length being long
enough. At each period in Uk, players switch with a small probability, implying that the number of switches in
Uk is determined stochastically. Their construction is such that every player is indiﬀerent between playing the
target action and playing the switching action. Either no player monitors, or all players monitor all opponents.
9 In BPK, information-exchange is simpler as it can be done through public announcements. They let every
player announce both switching stages, together with his switching actions, and his observations during monitor-
ing.
In MMS, this block is not used.
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player i equally randomizes between ai and bi. Otherwise, player i equally randomizes between
a¯i and b¯i. The purpose of these randomizations is to enforce opponents to buy information about
this stage later. If all players follow the prescribed strategies, then the randomizations at Ck
chosen by the diﬀerent players should match. (b) If a player has reported a deviation atDk−1: In
this case player i buys information about all previous stages and will find out who has deviated
from the prescribed strategy (possibly the player who wrongly reported at Dk−1 that somebody
deviated). From master-block Mk+1 on, the deviator will be punished by his opponents. For
instance, player 1 can be punished by his opponents if player 2 chooses b2 and player 3 chooses
a3, giving player 1 a payoﬀ of 0.1011
Deviation-report-block Dk: The purpose of this block is to enable the players to report
observed deviations.
Information purchase: Players buy no information.
Actions: If player i concludes, on the basis of his information about past stages, that some
opponent has deviated from the prescribed strategy, then he equally randomizes between a¯i and
b¯i; otherwise, player i equally randomizes between ai and bi.12
Recall that, before turning to the next master-block Mk+1, a new target-payoﬀ-vector uk+1
will be constructed as to compensate for “contaminating” payoﬀs in Mk−1. By construction,
such contaminating payoﬀs can only take place in the sub-blocks Ik−1 (n stages), Ck−1 (1 stage)
and Dk−1 (1 stage), as well as in the switching-stages in Uk−1 (at most 3 stages). Hence, in
total we have at least 2n − 3 stages with “correct” payoﬀs (all in Uk−1), and at most n + 5
stages with “wrong” payoﬀs in master-blockMk−1. As such, we can always choose δ and n large
enough such that (a) any sequence of “wrong” payoﬀs can be compensated by a target payoﬀ
vector uk+1 which lies in the interior of FIR, and (b) punishment of deviations remains eﬀective
despite the fact that it will only start at the end of the next master-block.
10Note that in this construction, the stages tjk for j 6= i can only be bought after buying block Ik. If players
could only buy one collection of past stages at every stage, block Ck could be modified as follows: Add one
additional stage to Ck. At the first stage, player i plays 12ai +
1
2 bi and purchases all stages in Ik, Ck−1 and Dk−1.
At the second stage, the player buys the stages tjk for all j 6= i, and plays as specified in Table 1.
11 In BPK, this block is not needed. By costlessly listening to the public announcements, players will immediately
have suﬃcient information regarding past actions and possible deviations.
In our case, if a player reports a deviation, the players will find out who has deviated by buying all previous
stages. In BPK, the task of finding out who deviated is more complex. In general, only the deviator and the
player who monitored him at the corresponding block will know who deviated. In BPK, both of these players will
be punished during a certain number of stages.
In MMS, a player has to state whether a given opponent has switched or not at a given previous stage.
Communication is based on actions, and not on public announcements.
12 In BPK, this type of communication is not needed due to the use of public announcements.
In MMS, a player checks the report of the reporting player in Ck, and approves or disapproves his answer by
playing actions in Dk.
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3.3. How Deviations Can Be Detected
Suppose that we are in master-blockMk, and that at previous deviation-report-blocksD1, ...,Dk−2
no player has reported a deviation. Then, deviations in Mk by player i can be detected in Mk
or Mk+1 by player j using one of the following detection mechanisms:
DM1. If player j in Ck buys information about the stage t˜ik reported in Ik by player i, and
notices that player i did not switch at that stage.
DM2. If player j in Ck buys information about the stage t˜j0k 6= t˜ik reported in Ik by player
j0, and notices that player i did not play the prescribed action at that stage. (Note that we need
at least three players for this to work.)
DM3. If player j in Ck+1 buys information about Ck and notices that player i has reported
diﬀerently at Ck than himself. Here, by “diﬀerently” we mean that player i has chosen a
duplicate action while player j has not, or vice versa.
DM4. If player j in Ck+1 buys information about Dk, notices that player i has reported
a deviation at Dk, buys all previous stages, and finds out that player i incorrectly reported a
deviation.
3.4. Why It Is Not Profitable To Deviate
We shall now explain why in the strategy profile above it is not profitable for any player i to
deviate at any stage by choosing a diﬀerent action and/or a diﬀerent information purchase. We
show for any deviation inMk, which without punishment could be profitable, that such deviation
will be detected, either in Mk or in Mk+1, with a positive probability which does not depend
on δ. Therefore, every such deviation, when detected, will be reported in Dk or Dk+1. Hence,
punishment of such deviations, when detected, will start no later than at Mk+3. Therefore, by
choosing δ suﬃciently close to 1, the punishments will be severe enough to render such deviations
unprofitable.
Assume that player i is the only player to deviate from the strategy profile described above.
We distinguish the following four exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases.
Case 1. Assume that player i’s first deviation is at Uk. There are three possibilities:
Case 1.1: Assume that the first deviation is to choose a diﬀerent probability distribution
over possible switching-stages. In fact, it does not matter how player i chooses the probability
distribution over possible switching-stages, since the modification of the target-payoﬀ at the
master-block Mk+2 makes player i indiﬀerent between any switching-stage that can be chosen.
Case 1.2: Assume that the first deviation is to choose a diﬀerent probability distribution
over actions. (a) If player i does not switch at all at Uk, this will eventually be detected with
probability 1 by DM1, since at Ik player i must report a switching-stage. (b) If player i switches
in Uk, but chooses a diﬀerent probability distribution over the switching-actions at the switching-
stage, then this is not profitable by the target-payoﬀ modification at the master block Mk+2.
(c) If player i switches in Uk but chooses a diﬀerent action at a non-switching stage, then either
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this stage or the switching-stage will not be reported at Ik. Let tˆik denote this stage. Then,
with probability at least c/(2n − 1)(2n + c) this stage tˆik coincides with the switching stage tj0k
of some third player j0 and will therefore be bought by player j at Ck. Therefore, player i will
be “caught” with probability at least c/(2n − 1)(2n + c) by DM2.
Case 1.3: Assume that the first deviation is to buy information at some stage in Uk. The
only useful insights that player i can obtain by buying information about past stages is to learn
whether his opponents have already switched at Uk. If he learns that both opponents have
already switched, he could deviate at all future non-switching-stages in Uk without running the
risk of being detected by his opponents, since only reported switching-stages will be bought (at
Ck). Suppose that player i at stage t2 in Uk is still not certain whether opponent j has switched
in Uk, and buys some stage t1 < t2 in Uk. Hence, he has a cost of (1 − δ)δt2−1c. Moreover, as
player i is uncertain about whether player j switched at t1 or will switch at the last stage in Uk,
the conditional probability that player j has switched at stage t1 is at most
c/(2n − 1)(2n + c)
c/(2n − 1)(2n + c) + 2n/(2n + c) =
c
c+ 2n(2n − 1) .
(Note that the probability of switching at stage t1 in Uk is initially equal to c/(2n − 1)(2n + c),
while the last stage is chosen with probability 2n/(2n+c).) If player j indeed switched at t1, then
player i does not have to buy this switching stage anymore at Ck, and in the best-case scenario
player i would moreover know that all opponents have switched before stage t2, in which case
he could safely deviate at the remaining stages in Uk. So, the total gain would be at most
(1− δ)
Ã
δzk+2
n+n−1c+
zk+2n−1X
t=t2
δt−1 · 1
!
,
where zk denotes the first stage in Uk. (Notice that (1− δ)δzk+2
n+n−1c is the cost which player
i would have to incur if he would buy stage t1 at Ck. Note also that the highest possible gain at
each stage is at most 1, as can be seen from the payoﬀ matrices). Therefore, the expected total
gain from buying stage t1 at stage t2 is at most
c
c+ 2n(2n − 1) · (1− δ)
Ã
δzk+2
n+n−1c+
zk+2n−1X
t=t2
δt−1 · 1
!
Since
c
c+ 2n(2n − 1) · (1− δ)
Ã
δzk+2
n+n−1c+
zk+2n−1X
t=t2
δt−1 · 1
!
≤ c
c+ 2n(2n − 1) · (1− δ)δ
t2−1 (c+ 2n)
≤ (1− δ)δt2−1c
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such deviation can never be profitable in expectation, as (1− δ)δt2−1c is the discounted cost of
buying information at stage t2 about stage t1.
Case 2. Assume that player i’s first deviation is at Ik. This implies that player i has switched
exactly once, at stage tik, in Uk. If player i chooses a diﬀerent probability distribution over the
prescribed actions, it would not be profitable by the target-payoﬀ modification at the master
block Mk+2. If player i reports a stage which is diﬀerent from tik, this will be detected by DM1.
Therefore, any information that player i would buy at Ik cannot be used in Ik since it is in
player i’s best interest to report stage tik here. Hence, buying such information is best delayed
until the beginning of block Ck.
Case 3. Assume that player i’s first deviation is at Ck. First of all, choosing a diﬀerent
probability distribution over the prescribed actions is not profitable by the target-payoﬀ modi-
fication at the master block Mk+2. If he deviates by choosing a non-prescribed action, then, by
definition, it will be detected by DM3. Finally, if player i buys less information at Ck, then, with
probability 1/2, player i will be wrong about the parity of the sum of the number of a’s and the
number of a¯’s at the reported switching stages and blocks Ck−1,Dk−1. Hence, with probability
1/2 he reports diﬀerently than player j at Ck. Consequently, with probability 1/2 he chooses a
non-prescribed action which will be detected by DM3.
Case 4. Assume that player i’s first deviation is at Dk. Since we assume that player i is the
only player who deviates, player i is supposed to play 12ai +
1
2bi here. First of all, it does not
matter how player i chooses the probability distribution over ai and bi, since the modification
of the target-payoﬀ at master-block Mk+2 makes player i indiﬀerent between them. If player i
chooses a duplicate action, thereby wrongly reporting a deviation, this will be detected in Ck+1
by DM4. Obviously, buying information at Dk is useless.
4. Formal Proof of Main Result
4.1. Outline
Consider a repeated game satisfying full dimensionality. Suppose there are m ≥ 3 players and
every player has at least four actions. Take an arbitrary payoﬀ vector u ∈ int(FIR). Our goal
is to find a lower bound δ(u) ∈ (0, 1) for the discount factor, and for every δ ∈ (δ(u), 1) to
construct a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game with expected δ-discounted payoﬀ vector
equal to u. For a fixed u the outline of the construction is as follows:
In Subsection 4.2 we first show how to choose δ(u). Take an arbitrary discount factor δ ∈
(δ(u), 1). In Subsection 4.3 we construct a strategy profile. In Subsection 4.4 we show that it
has expected δ-discounted payoﬀ u . In Subsection 4.5, finally, we prove that it is an equilibrium
in the δ-discounted repeated game. This will complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
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4.2. Choice of δ(u)
Recall that we assume that the dimension of FIR is equal to m. Therefore, there exists some
α > 0 such that B4α(u) ⊆ FIR, where B4α(u) denotes the open ball with center u and radius
4α with respect to the maximum norm.
Let R := {(vi(a))i∈I | a ∈ ×i∈IAi} be the set of stage-payoﬀ vectors induced by pure action
profiles. Hence, the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors is the convex hull of R. Let r∗ := 2maxr∈R krk ,
where k·k denotes the maximum norm. Therefore, the maximum variation in payoﬀ at a certain
stage can never exceed r∗. Given α, choose a large enough N of the form N = 2n + n+ 2, with
n ∈ N, such that the following two properties hold:
(1) Every payoﬀ-vector r ∈ FIR can be approximated suﬃciently closely by the average
payoﬀ of a sequence of N pure action profiles. Formally, for every r ∈ FIR there exists a
sequence r1, r2, ..., rN in R such that°°°°r − r1 + r2 + ...+ rNN
°°°° ≤ α12 .
(2) Variations in stage-payoﬀs during at most log2N + m + 2 stages within a block of N
consecutive stages have little influence on the average payoﬀ. Formally,
dlog2Ne+m+ 2
N
r∗ ≤ α
12
,
where dxe denotes the lowest integer above or equal to x.
Subsequently, we choose δ(u) ∈ (0, 1) close enough to 1 such that for every δ ∈ (δ(u), 1) the
following properties hold:
(3) For every sequence r1, r2, ..., rN in R, it holds that the δ-discounted sum is close enough
to the average. Formally, °°°°°
PN
t=1 δ
t−1rtPN
t=1 δ
t−1 −
r1 + r2 + ...+ rN
N
°°°°° ≤ α12 .
(4) The δ-discounted influence of variations during at most log2N +m+ 2 stages within a
block of N consecutive stages is close enough to the average influence. Formally,¯¯¯¯
¯
Pdlog2Ne+m+2
t=1 δ
t−1PN
t=1 δ
t−1 r
∗ − dlog2Ne+m+ 2
N
r∗
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤ α12 .
(5) Even after two blocks of N stages, the payoﬀs are not discounted “too much”. Formally,
δ2N >
1
3
.
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(6) The maximum variation in δ-discounted payoﬀ during three blocks of N stages is limited.
Formally,
3NX
t=1
δt−1r∗ ≤ c
N(N + c)
∞X
t=3N+1
δt−1α.
4.3. Strategy Profile
For a given u, let N = 2n + n + 2 and δ(u) be chosen as specified above. Take an arbitrary
δ ∈ (δ(u), 1). By properties (1) and (3) above, one can construct for every r ∈ FIR a sequence
ξ(r) := (ξ1(r), ξ2(r), ..., ξN (r)) in R with°°°°°
PN
t=1 δ
t−1ξt(r)PN
t=1 δ
t−1 − r
°°°°° ≤ α6 .
In fact, we only need ξt(r) for t ≤ 2n, but we include N stages for technical reasons. For every
r ∈ FIR, define
ϕ(r) :=
PN
t=1 δ
t−1ξt(r)PN
t=1 δ
t−1 .
Similarly to our example in Section 3, we build a sequence of blocks (U1, I1, C1,D1, U2, ...)
where each utility block Uk has 2n stages, each information-exchange-block Ik has n stages,
each control block Ck has 1 stage and each deviation-report block Dk has 1 stage. Hence, every
master-block Mk (consisting of Uk, Ik, Ck and Dk) has length N. The purpose of each of these
blocks is the same as in the example. We define a strategy profile as follows:
In block U1, the target-payoﬀ vector u1 is chosen equal to u. At the beginning of U1, every
player i randomly chooses a switching-stage ti1 according to the probability distribution specified
in Table 1. At all stages t of U1, player i chooses the pure action corresponding to ξt(u1), except
for the switching stage ti1 at which he randomizes equally between the two non-prescibed actions
with lowest indices, say a¯i and b¯i.
For the blocks I1, C1 and D1, we may take for each player i these two actions a¯i and b¯i
together with two other actions, say ai and bi, for communication. The behavior of the players
in these blocks is then identical to Table 1.
In block U2 the target-payoﬀ vector u2 is still equal to u, and the behavior of the players in
master-block M2 is the same as in M1.
If all players follow the prescribed strategy, every player knows after C2 the realized actions
and payoﬀs in M1. Let (rt)t∈M1 denote the sequence of realized
13 payoﬀ vectors in M1. Given
these realized payoﬀs, choose the target-payoﬀ vector u3 for U3 such thatX
t∈M1
δt−1(rt − u1) +
X
t∈M3
δt−1u3 =
X
t∈M3
δt−1u.
13More precisely, each player has a belief about the payoﬀs in U1. If no player deviates, then all these beliefs
will coincide with rt.
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This way, u3 compensates for the diﬀerence between the target payoﬀ u1 and the realized payoﬀ
in block M1. The equation above gives
u3 =
P
t∈M1 δ
t−1(u1 − rt) +
P
t∈M3 δ
t−1uP
t∈M3 δ
t−1 .
At the t-th stage of U3, every player i chooses the pure action corresponding to ξt(u3), except
when t is i’s switching stage. The remainder of block M3 is the same as in M1 and M2.
In general, for every k ≥ 3, let (rt)t∈Mk−2 denote the sequence of realized payoﬀ vectors in
Mk−2. We choose the target-payoﬀ vector uk for Uk such thatX
t∈Mk−2
δt−1(rt − uk−2) +
X
t∈Mk
δt−1uk =
X
t∈Mk
δt−1u, (4.1)
and hence
uk =
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1(uk−2 − rt) +
P
t∈Mk δ
t−1uP
t∈Mk δ
t−1 .
The remainder of block Mk is as usual.
In order to show that these strategies are well-defined, we prove that uk ∈ int(FIR) for all k.
To this purpose, we shall show that kuk − uk < α for all k, implying that uk ∈ Bα(u) ⊆ int(FIR)
for all k.
For k = 1 and k = 2, the statement holds trivially since u1 = u2 = u. By equation (4.1), we
have for every k ≥ 3 that
kuk − uk =
°°°°°
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1(uk−2 − rt)P
t∈Mk δ
t−1
°°°°°
=
1
δ2N
°°°°°
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1(uk−2 − rt)P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1
°°°°°
=
1
δ2N
°°°°°uk−2 −
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1rtP
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1
°°°°°
≤ 1
δ2N
Ã
kuk−2 − ϕ(uk−2)k+
°°°°°ϕ(uk−2)−
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1rtP
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1
°°°°°
!
. (4.2)
By definition of ϕ(uk−2),
kϕ(uk−2)− uk−2k ≤ α
6
. (4.3)
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Again, by definition of ϕ(uk−2),°°°°°ϕ(uk−2)−
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1rtP
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1
°°°°° =
°°°°°δ(k−3)N
PN
t=1 δ
t−1ξt(uk−2)
δ(k−3)N
PN
t=1 δ
t−1 −
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1rtP
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1
°°°°°
=
°°°°°
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1(ξt(uk−2)− rt)P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1
°°°°°
≤
Pm+n+2
t=1 δ
t−1r∗PN
t=1 δ
t−1 ,
since, by construction, there are at most m + n + 2 stages in Mk−2 where the realized payoﬀ
rt is diﬀerent from the target payoﬀ ξt(uk−2). Since m + n + 2 ≤ log2N +m + 2, we have by
properties (2) and (4) thatPm+n+2
t=1 δ
t−1r∗PN
t=1 δ
t−1 ≤
Pdlog2Ne+m+2
t=1 δ
t−1r∗PN
t=1 δ
t−1 ≤
α
6
,
and hence °°°°°ϕ(uk−2)−
P
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1rtP
t∈Mk−2 δ
t−1
°°°°° ≤ α6 . (4.4)
By inequalities (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) it follows that
kuk − uk ≤ 1
δ2N
(
α
6
+
α
6
) < α,
where the last inequality follows from property (5). We thus have shown that uk ∈ Bα(u) ⊆
int(FIR) for all k, and therefore the strategy profile is well-defined.
16
4.4. Expected δ-discounted Payoﬀ is Equal to u
Take a discount factor δ ∈ (δ(u), 1) and consider the corresponding strategy profile as defined
in Subsection 4.3. From (4.1) it follows that
∞X
k=1, k odd
X
t∈Mk
δt−1rt =
∞X
k=3, k odd
X
t∈Mk−2
δt−1rt
=
∞X
k=3, k odd
⎛
⎝ X
t∈Mk−2
δt−1uk−2 −
X
t∈Mk
δt−1uk +
X
t∈Mk
δt−1u
⎞
⎠
=
X
t∈M1
δt−1u1 +
∞X
k=3, k odd
X
t∈Mk
δt−1u
=
∞X
k=1, k odd
X
t∈Mk
δt−1u.
Similarly, one can show that
∞X
k=2, k even
X
t∈Mk
δt−1rt =
∞X
k=2, k even
X
t∈Mk
δt−1u.
Together, we obtain
∞X
k=1
X
t∈Mk
δt−1rt =
∞X
k=1
X
t∈Mk
δt−1u,
and hence
(1− δ)
∞X
t=1
δt−1rt = u,
which means that, with probability 1, the total δ-discounted realized payoﬀ is exactly u. This
implies in particular that the expected δ-discounted payoﬀ is equal to u, as desired.
4.5. The Strategy-Profile is an Equilibrium in the δ-discounted Repeated Game
Consider, again, a discount-factor δ ∈ (δ(u), 1) and the corresponding strategy profile. Suppose
that player i would deviate for the first time at master-block Mk, and that no other player has
deviated before. In Subsection 3.3 we have described how player i’s opponents can detect such a
deviation by means of the detection mechanisms DM1 until DM4. Moreover, in Subsection 3.4
we have shown that any deviation that could possibly lead to an improvement will be detected
with probability at least c/(2n− 1)(2n+ c). By construction, if the deviation is detected, it will
be reported no later than in Dk+1, and hence will be noticed by the other players no later than
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in Ck+2. Therefore, punishment will start no later than inMk+3. These arguments are also valid
for the general strategy profile we consider here. We will now show that punishments are severe
enough to render any deviation unprofitable.
By deviating in blockMk, the maximum δ-discounted gain that player i can achieve in blocks
Mk,Mk+1 and Mk+2 is X
t∈Mk∪Mk+1∪Mk+2
δt−1r∗.
If the deviation will be detected, his loss in any master-block Ml (l ≥ k + 3) will be at leastX
t∈Ml
δt−1α.
For if player i did not deviate, the target-payoﬀ vector ul would, by construction, be in Bα(u).
On the other hand, α was chosen such that B2a(u) ⊆ FIR, which implies that i’s punishment
payoﬀ is not even in B2a(u). Therefore, the distance between i’s punishment payoﬀ and i’s payoﬀ
in ul is at least α. Since i’s deviation will be detected at least with probability c/(2n−1)(2n+c),
player i’s expected gain from deviating at Mk will be at mostX
t∈Mk∪Mk+1∪Mk+2
δt−1r∗ − c
(2n − 1)(2n + c)
X
l≥k+3
X
t∈Ml
δt−1α
= δ(k−1)N
Ã
3NX
t=1
δt−1r∗ − c
(2n − 1)(2n + c)
∞X
t=3N+1
δt−1α
!
≤ δ(k−1)N
Ã
3NX
t=1
δt−1r∗ − c
N(N + c)
∞X
t=3N+1
δt−1α
!
≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows from property (6). Hence, no deviation is profitable, which
completes the proof.
5. Sequential Equilibrium
In this section we prove that our main result does not only hold for Nash equilibrium, but
also for sequential equilibrium. A strategy profile is called a sequential equilibrium if for every
player i and every possible history for player i, his continuation strategy is optimal against the
opponents’ expected continuation strategies. Below we will construct, for every payoﬀ-vector
u in int(FIR) and every discount factor δ close enough to 1, a sequential equilibrium σ that
induces the payoﬀ-vector u. Moreover, the total cost for buying information in σ will be close
to 0 (in fact, tends to 0 if δ approaches 1).
18
Note that the strategy profile as constructed in Section 3 will in general not be a sequential
equilibrium. The problem arises after a player detects a deviation. In that case, the continuation
strategy of a player will in general not be optimal against the opponents’ expected continuation
strategies. Often, it would not be in a player’s interest to report a deviation, because according
to the strategy profile he would have to buy all previous stages in this case, and punish the
deviating player afterwards. These two activities would in general hurt the player.
In order to overcome these problems, we now make sure that it becomes optimal for a player
to report an opponent’s deviation whenever he detects one. To this purpose, we make the
following adjustments when a player reports a deviation:
1. Players do not have to buy previous stages to find out the true identity of the deviator,
because the deviator will be named by one of the players, say player j, who reported a deviation.
A target-payoﬀ modification will assure that player j is indiﬀerent between any opponent he can
name, so he is trustworthy.14
2. Punishments now take place during finitely many stages only. When necessary, the report-
ing player is compensated (or charged) for possible losses (or gains) caused by the punishments
by means of a target-payoﬀ modification.
5.1. Outline of the Plan of Action
A plan of action is a description of a player’s behavior as long as he has not deviated himself
from this plan. We will now describe the plan of action τ i for every player i. Later, in Section
5.4, we will extend the plan of action τ i to a complete strategy σi, which also describes what
player i will do in case he has deviated from τ i. In the previous sections it was suﬃcient to
describe a plan of action for every player since the concept of Nash equilibrium, in contrast with
sequential equilibrium, does not require a player i to choose optimally after he has deviated
himself from τ i.
Just as in Section 3 play is divided into diﬀerent master-blocks, in this case regular master-
blocks and punishment master-blocks. Regular master-blocksMk are defined similarly to Section
3, except for some slight modifications that occur after a punishment. These changes will be
described in Section 5.3. Punishment master-blocks P [j] will be really new, and are meant to
punish a player during a finite number of stages. Section 5.2 provides a detailed description of
P [j]. Here, j denotes the player who can name a deviator. The transition between these blocks
proceeds according to the following inductive scheme:
Play starts with a regular master-block M1.
After regular master-block Mk, the new master-block is determined as follows:
Let P [j0] be the last punishment master-block before Mk. If no punishment has yet taken
place, let j0 be player 1.
14He may not be trustworthy if he is the only deviator, because in this case he cannot name an opponent who
deviated.
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* If no player other than j0 reported a deviation in Dk−1 (which is bought at Mk), we enter
a regular master-block Mk+1.15
* Otherwise, we first enter a punishment master-block P [j], after which we go to a regular
master-block Mk+1. The reporting player j in P [j] is determined as follows: Let j1 and j2 be
the players with the lowest respectively highest index not equal to j0 who reported a deviation
in Dk−1 (possibly j1 = j2). If the sum of the number of a’s and a¯’s at Dk−1 is even, then the
reporting player j will be j1. If the sum is odd, then j will be j2.16
5.2. Plan of Action for the Punishment Master-Block
As we discussed above, the major diﬀerence with Section 3 lies in the construction of the pun-
ishments. In a punishment master-block, following a regular master-block Mk and initiated by
a reported deviation in Dk−1, there is a special role for a player j who can name a deviating
player. The corresponding punishment master-block will be called P [j]. The play in this phase
will consist of four blocks, R∗[j], C∗, P ∗ and C∗∗. Table 2 provides a summary of the players’
behavior in P [j].
1. Block R∗[j]: The purpose of this block is to enable player j to name a player j∗ as the
deviator. Player j must choose randomly amongst the players whose deviations he has detected
(including players who deviated at Dk−1, that is, players who should have reported a deviation
in Dk−1 but omitted to do so, and players who falsely reported a deviation at Dk−1).17
This block has length dlog2me , where m is the number of players.
Information purchase: During block R∗[j] no player buys any information.
Actions: Player j will name in binary code the identity of a player as the deviator. Recall
that we use randomization 12aj+
1
2bj for digit 0 and
1
2 a¯j+
1
2 b¯j for digit 1. Hence, dlog2me stages
are suﬃcient for reporting such binary code.
All other players i choose 12ai +
1
2bi.
2. Block C∗: The purpose of this block is to guarantee that all players buy all stages
in R∗[j], so that all players will know the player j∗ that has been reported by player j as the
deviator. This block consists of 1 stage.
Information purchase: Each player buys all stages in R∗[j]. Now all players will know j∗ (if
player j reported a number that does not correspond to a player, then let j∗ = j).
15By ignoring a possible report by j0 alone, we avoid the situation where j0 would have to keep on reporting
deviations, which would imply that he could no longer be compensated for carrying out so many punishments.
By our construction, the next player who can report the deviator must be diﬀerent from j0, so that after the
punishment we can apply a diﬀerent kind of target-payoﬀ modification for j0. This then enables us to position
the new target-payoﬀ for j0 such that he could be compensated next time.
16This lottery between j1 and j2 makes sure that it cannot happen that a player deviates in Uk−1 while
knowing that, with probability 1, he will be able to name somebody else as the deviator, and thereby avoiding
being punished. Even though j1 = j2 is possible, you can never know this in advance.
17Note that in a plan of action τ j player j cannot be a deviator himself.
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actions
information
purchase
R∗[j]
(dlog2me stages)
* Player j reports identity of deviator j∗ in binary code
* Every non-reporting player i plays 12ai +
1
2bi
none
C∗
(1 stage)
* Every player i plays 12ai +
1
2bi if the sum of the
number of a’s and a¯’s at R∗[j] is even
* Plays 12 a¯i +
1
2 b¯i otherwise
R∗[j]
P ∗
(finitely many stages)
* All punishing players i 6= j∗ play min-max action
against j∗ (with small perturbation)
* Punished player j∗ plays best reply against
opponents’ actions at every stage
none
C∗∗
(1 stage)
* Every player i plays 12ai +
1
2bi if the sum of the
number of a’s and a¯’s at P ∗ is even
* Plays 12 a¯i +
1
2 b¯i otherwise
P ∗
Table 2: Plans of action in punishment master-block P [j]
Actions: Every player i plays 12ai +
1
2bi if the sum of the number of a’s and the number of
a¯’s at R∗[j] is even, and plays 12 a¯i +
1
2 b¯i otherwise.
3. Punishment-block P ∗: The purpose of this block is to suﬃciently punish player j∗.
The length of this block can be chosen dependent of the length of a regular master-block, but
independent of δ (given δ is large enough).
Information purchase: No player buys any information.
Actions: Let α−j∗ be the mixed action profile for j∗’s opponents such that
dj∗ = max
aj∗∈Aj∗
vj∗(aj∗ , α−j∗).
Hence, α−j∗ is the min-max mixed action-profile against j∗. At every stage in P ∗, every punishing
player i 6= j∗ plays with high probability his mixed action αi in α−j∗ and with low probability
any other action in Ai. As such, every action in Ai will be played with positive probability at
every stage in P ∗. The probability of playing αi must be chosen (1) high enough so that player
j∗’s expected payoﬀ at every stage does not exceed dj∗ by much, and (2) low enough so that at
P ∗ there will be suﬃcient uncertainty about the actions, and therefore it will be in the players’
interest to buy every stage of P ∗ at the following block C∗∗.18 The punished player j∗ plays at
every stage a best reply against the mixed action-profile of his opponents.
4. Block C∗∗: The purpose of this block is to guarantee that all players buy all stages in
P ∗. This is important for the target-payoﬀ modification later on. This block consists of 1 stage.
18This idea is rather standard.
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Information purchase: Each player buys all stages in P ∗.
Actions: Every player i plays 12ai +
1
2bi if the sum of the number of a’s and the number of
a¯’s at P ∗ is even, and plays 12 a¯i +
1
2 b¯i otherwise.
5.3. Plan of Action for a Regular Master-Block after a Punishment Master-Block
As we know from Section 5.1, after a punishment master-block P [j], following a regular master-
block Mk and initiated by a reported deviation in Dk−1, we go back to a regular master-block
Mk+1. This regular master-block is defined as in Section 3, with the only exceptions that now (1)
at Ck+1 players will also buy information about the blocks C∗ and C∗∗ in P [j], and the report at
Ck+1 should also depend on the observed actions at these two blocks, and (2) the target-payoﬀ
has to be constructed in a diﬀerent way.
The idea behind the target-payoﬀ modification is as follows. We will choose the new target-
payoﬀ vector such that it lies in B2α(u) ⊆ int(FIR). Each player’s target-payoﬀ should take
the realized actions at R∗[j] and P ∗ into account, so that each player is indiﬀerent between the
actions at R∗[j] and P ∗ on which he was supposed to randomize.19 Also, the reporting player
j in R∗[j] should be made indiﬀerent between all players he can report, as far as the payoﬀs is
R∗[j] are concerned. Further, the target-payoﬀ for the player who was punished, say player j∗,
is chosen in such a way that punishment remains eﬀective. For all players except j and j∗ the
target-payoﬀ is chosen such that, if they become the reporting player next time, they can be
compensated (this means that the target-payoﬀ should stay away from the boundary of FIR).
Moreover, their target-payoﬀ should be independent of j and j∗. For the target-payoﬀ of player
j we distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Assume that player j was the only player, except for possibly j0, who reported a
deviation at Dk−1 (recall that P [j0] was the last punishment-master-block; if no punishment
has yet taken place then j0 = 1). In this case, the target-payoﬀ for player j is modified as to
compensate (or charge) him for possible losses (or gains) in payoﬀs during R∗[j] and P ∗.
Case 2. Assume that there is a player other than j and j0 who reported a deviation at Dk−1.
In this case, the target-payoﬀ for player j is modified just as for the other players, except j∗.
5.4. Construction of the Strategy Profile
The previous three subsections together describe a plan of action τ i for player i, but not a
complete strategy yet. The remaining problem is that we did not describe what player i should
do in case he has not acted consistently with τ i in the past. We will now completely define
player i’s strategy σi.
We distinguish the following cases:
19Note that the actions at the other two blocks C∗ and C∗∗ will be bought at Ck+1, and the target-payoﬀ
modification at the following regular master-block Mk+2 will take these actions into account.
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Case 1. Assume that during hi player i has bought less or more information than prescribed
by τ i. Then, player i should calculate, for every opponent j, the expected continuation strategy
under the assumption that j has bought exactly the information as prescribed by τ j (meaning
that j is not in Case 1, but in Case 2 below). Moreover, player i should play a best reponse
against these expected continuation strategies.
Case 2. Assume that during hi player i has bought exactly the information as prescribed by
τ i.
In this case, player i knows exactly all switching stages by his opponents, and therefore
knows the stages that other players were supposed to buy.
Suppose the game is in a certain master-block, and that hi is the corresponding history for
player i. We say that a block is reported in hi if in hi the players had the opportunity to report
any deviation in this block. More precisely, let Dk be the last deviation-report-block in hi. Then,
all blocks before Dk, except Ck, are reported in hi.
Case 2.1 Assume that in all non-reported blocks player i has acted consistently with τ i.20
Then his behavior σi(hi) at the current stage is given by τ i.
Case 2.2. Assume that player i has played inconsistently with τ i in some non-reported block.
21
Case 2.2.1. Assume that play is at Ck in regular master-block Mk, or at C∗, P ∗ or C∗∗ in
punishment master-block P [j]. Then, player i continues with the master-block according to τ i
(as if he had not deviated).
Case 2.2.2. Assume that play is at R∗[j] in punishment master-block P [j], following a regular
master-blockMk, and initiated by a reported deviation in Dk−1. If i 6= j, then player i continues
according to τ i (as if he had not deviated). If i = j (so i is the reporting player) then let I∗
be the set of opponents whom player i can still report given his previous actions at R∗[j]. If
I∗ is empty, then player i plays an arbitrary action (he cannot avoid getting detected anyhow).
Otherwise, player i randomly chooses an opponent in I∗ and plays the corresponding action.
Case 2.2.3. Assume that play is at Dk in a regular master-blockMk. If player i believes that
his deviation has been detected by an opponent other than j0 22 (recall that P [j0] was the last
punishment-master-block; if no punishment has yet taken place, then j0 = 1), or has detected a
deviation by an opponent, he reports a deviation at this stage. Otherwise, he does not report a
20Note that the construction of τ i directly extends to this situation.
21The idea in this case is to let player i return to τ i as soon as he can do so without running additional risk of
getting caught. In the remaining part of Case 2.2, we describe player i’s optimal substrategy until he can return
to τ i. Obviously, the existence of such an optimal substrategy on finitely many stages is guaranteed. In fact, we
do more than necessary since we would only need to show that such a substrategy allows player i to report in
Dk a deviation he detected (see Case 2.2.3). Note that it was essential in our construction that each player takes
part in the detection process - this is why we needed at least three players.
22Recall that player i knows exactly all switching stages by his opponents, and therefore knows the stages
that other players were supposed to buy. This implies that player i knows who is supposed to have detected his
deviation.
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deviation.
Case 2.2.4. Assume that play is at Uk or Ik in a regular master-block Mk. Conditionally on
player i behaving according to τ i from Ck on (as if he had not deviated), he can calculate by
backward induction an optimal substrategy for the remaining stages until Ck. Player i will act
according to this optimal substrategy.
5.5. Strategy Profile is a Sequential Equilibrium
It should be clear that the strategy profile constructed above induces the desired discounted
expected payoﬀ u, as it coincides with the strategy profile in Section 3 as long as no deviation
has taken place. We will now show that the strategy profile constructed above constitutes
a sequential equilibrium. That is, for every history hi ∈ Hi, we must show that player i’s
continuation strategy σi[hi] is optimal against the opponents’ expected continuation strategies.
Suppose that player i considers a deviation after hi. We will show that such a deviation cannot
be profitable. We distinguish six cases here:
Case A. Assume that player i considers a deviation in Case 1 of Section 5.4. In this case, a
possible belief for player i is to believe that every opponent j has bought exactly the information
as prescribed in τ j . Hence, player i is supposed to act optimally given this belief, and can
therefore not profitably deviate after hi.
Case B. Assume that player i considers a deviation in Case 2.1.
Case B.1. Assume that player i considers a deviation in a regular master-block Mk.
Case B.1.1. Assume that the deviation is planned for block Uk, Ik or Ck. Then player i
believes that this deviation will be detected by the opponents in exactly the same way as in
Section 3. The eventual punishment will make sure that such deviation is unprofitable.23
Case B.1.2. Assume that the deviation is planned for block Dk. Recall that j0 is the last
player who reported a deviation beforeMk which actually led to a punishment; if no such report
has been made before Mk, then j0 is chosen equal to player 1. If i = j0 then, by construction, i
has no influence whether or not a punishment will follow, and the target-payoﬀ modification will
assure that i is indiﬀerent between any action he can take. So, we will assume in the following
subcases that i 6= j0.
Let I˜ be the set of opponents of player i, except j0, who, according to player i, should report
a deviation in Dk.
Case B.1.2.1. Assume that I˜ is empty. By reporting a deviation, player i believes that he will
be the only reporting player, except j0, and will therefore believe that he will be compensated by
the target-payoﬀ modification (cf. Section 5.3, Case 1). This would give him the same expected
discounted payoﬀ as he would get by not reporting. Player i is therefore indiﬀerent between
reporting and not reporting.
Case B.1.2.2. Assume that I˜ is not empty. We distinguish two cases.
23Player i does not know in advance which opponent would detect his deviation. Therefore, with a positive
probability, it would be an opponent diﬀerent from j0, which would result in a punishment.
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Case B.1.2.2.1. Assume that I˜ contains only one player, say j. Then, player i knows that
there has been a deviation. If player i deviates by not reporting this deviation, then he believes
that j will be the only player other than j0 who reports a deviation in Dk, and that he will name,
with a positive probability, player i as the deviator in R∗[j]. Hence, player i will be punished,
with positive probability, by not reporting this deviation.
Case B.1.2.2.2. Assume that I˜ contains more than one player. Then, it does not make a
diﬀerence whether player i reports a deviation or not due to the target-payoﬀ modification (cf.
Section 5.3, Case 2).
Case B.2. Assume that player i considers a deviation in a punishment master-block P [j],
following master-block Mk and initiated by a reported deviation in Dk−1.
Case B.2.1 : Assume that the deviation is planned for block R∗[j]. If player i chooses a
diﬀerent probability distribution over the prescribed actions, it would not be profitable by the
target-payoﬀ modification (even if player i is the reporting player, that is, if i = j). Obviously,
buying information at R∗[j] is useless.
Case B.2.2 : Assume that the deviation is planned for block C∗. The proof is basically
identical to a regular block Ck.
Case B.2.3 : Assume that the deviation is planned for punishment-block P ∗. It is clear that
buying information is useless. If i = j∗ (the player who is being punished) then such deviation
cannot be profitable, since player i is supposed to play a best reply against the opponents’ mixed
actions. If i is one of the punishers, then the target-payoﬀ modification makes him indiﬀerent
between any action he could choose. Hence, no deviation can be profitable.
Case B.2.4 : Assume that the deviation is planned for block C∗∗. The proof is basically
identical to a regular block Ck.
Case C. Assume that player i considers a deviation in Case 2.2.1. So, player i considers a
deviation in block Ck of a regular master-block Mk, or in block C∗, P ∗ or C∗∗ of a punishment
master-block P [j]. By construction, all stages of these blocks are bought by all players, and
taken into account at the target-payoﬀ modification, and deviations are punished.
Case D. Assume that player i considers a deviation in Case 2.2.2. So, player i considers a
deviation in block R∗[j] in a punishment master-block P [j]. By construction, all stages in R∗[j]
are bought later at C∗. If i 6= j, then by the target-payoﬀ modification, the actions chosen
by player i have no influence on his expected discounted payoﬀ. If i = j, then punishments
make sure that it is optimal for player i to report an opponent (if this is still possible). By
the target-payoﬀ modification, player i will be indiﬀerent between any opponent he can name.
Hence, no deviation is profitable.
Case E. Assume that player i considers a deviation in Case 2.2.3. So, player i considers
a deviation in block Dk of a regular master-block. If i = j0 (recall that P [j0] was the last
punishment-master-block; if no punishment has yet taken place, then j0 = 1) then he cannot
become the player who names the deviator. Hence, due to the target-payoﬀ modification, he
has no reason to deviate from the prescribed behavior in Case 2.2.3. We may therefore assume
from now on that i 6= j0.
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Let I˜ be the set of opponents of player i, except j0, who, according to player i, should report
a deviation in Dk. We distinguish the following cases:
Case E.1. Assume that I˜ is empty. By reporting a deviation, player i would believe that he
will be the only reporting player except player j0 possibly, and will therefore believe that he will
be compensated by the target-payoﬀ modification (see Section 5.3, Case 1). This would give
him the same expected discounted payoﬀ as he would get by not reporting. Player i is therefore
indiﬀerent between reporting and not reporting a deviation.
Case E.2. Assume that I˜ contains only one opponent, say j. Then, i believes that a deviation
has been detected, and believes that j knows that i is aware of this deviation. Consequently,
player i is supposed to report a deviation according to the strategy profile. We distinguish two
cases:
Case E.2.1. Assume that i believes that his deviation has been detected by a player other
than j0. Then, j must be the player who detected the deviation by player i. So, player j would
name, with positive probability, player i as the deviator. Hence, player i’s only chance to escape
from punishment is to report a deviation himself (and name another player as the deviator).
Case E.2.2. Assume that i believes that his deviation has not been detected by a player
other than j0. If player i deviates by not reporting at Dk, then he believes that j will be the
only player other than j0 who reports a deviation in Dk, and that he will name, with a positive
probability, player i as the deviator in R∗[j]. Hence, player i will be punished, with positive
probability, by not reporting this deviation.
Case E.3. Assume that I˜ contains more than one opponent. Then, it does not make a
diﬀerence whether player i reports a deviation or not due to the target-payoﬀ modification (cf.
Section 5.3, Case 2).
Case F. Assume that player i considers a deviation in Case 2.2.4. So, player i considers a
deviation at Uk or Ik in a regular master-block Mk. If player i would play according to τ i from
Ck on, then, by construction, no deviation can be profitable. If player i would not play according
to τ i from Ck on, such deviation would fall under a previous case.
If there would be at least four players, then an additional idea would be the following: If a
deviation is reported, then all players who reported a deviation are asked to report a deviator,
and the player who has been named at least twice will be punished. The diﬀerence is that with
four players or more, according to the plan of action, there will always be at least three players
who observe a deviation. Hence, even if one of the reporting players would deviate by reporting
diﬀerently, there would still be at least two players who report correctly.
26
6. Extensions and Concluding Remarks
6.1. At Least Three Players, At Least Two Players with At Least Four Actions,
Other Players with At Least Three Actions
In this case, our construction can easily be generalized as follows: In Uk, the players follow the
prescribed actions, except for the switching stages at which they randomize equally between
two non-prescribed actions. In Ik, Ck and Dk, the two players with at least four actions play
according to Table 1. The players with less than four actions use only one action for each of
the two possible reports. Since with this construction every player is uncertain at Ik, Ck and
Dk about the actions of at least one opponent, every player is forced to buy information as in
Table 1. Our main theorem would therefore still hold in this case.
6.2. Three Players, Three Actions
If we have three players, the extension of our result to three actions is problematic for the
following reasons: First of all, the construction as summarized in Table 1 cannot be generalized
for three actions. The main problem lies in control-block Ck , where players have to send
a report based on the observed actions. For four actions it was possible to construct two
diﬀerent probabilistic reports, each one randomizing over two actions, with disjoint supports.
It is essential that both reports randomize over at least two actions since otherwise players will
not have an incentive to buy this stage. We also need that the two supports are disjoint. For
if there would be an action a contained in both supports, then the player could always play a
without purchasing information about past stages while being sure that this will not be detected
by his opponents. Clearly, having two disjoint supports of two actions is not possible with only
three actions.
For three actions, say a, b and c, one could attempt to overcome this problem by constructing
three, instead of two, diﬀerent codes for reporting at Ck. A first code with support {a, b}, a
second with support {b, c} and a third with support {a, c}. In this way, each code still uses a
randomization, and there is no action contained in all three supports. The report to be sent
by player i in Ck would still depend on the actions observed by purchasing information about
block Ik and the switching stages tjk for all players j. However, if there is a switching stage tjk
which is only chosen by one player j 6= i, then player i need not purchase tjk in Ck. The reason
is as follows: Since player j has only two possible switching actions, player i can reduce, without
buying tjk, the possible reports to two. As these two reports have a common action, player i
could safely play this action without buying information about tjk. So, this would not work.
The problem above occurred since players only had two possible switching actions. One
could attempt to overcome this problem by letting the players randomize equally over all three
actions at the switching stages. By this construction, player i would have an incentive to buy
all switching stages, since he can no longer reduce the possible reports to two without buying
all opponents’ switching stages. However, with probability 1/3 the switching action of player
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i coincides with the action prescribed by the target-payoﬀ-vector at that stage. This leads to
the following problem in block Ik: Suppose player i has chosen a switching action at stage tik
diﬀerent from the action prescribed by the target-payoﬀ-vector, and by switching he received a
higher payoﬀ. Then, player i could profitably deviate in Ik in the following way: Player i could
buy information about the first stage in Ik at the beginning of the second stage in Ik. With a
positive probability, each opponent of player i chose a code diﬀerent from player i’s. Hence, with
a positive probability, player i may conclude that both opponents have chosen a switching stage
diﬀerent from tik. In this case, player i may safely report a switching stage t˜ik 6= tik in Ik, since
tik will not be bought by the other players and the prescribed action at t˜ik is also a possible
switching action. By doing so, the gain in payoﬀ at tik would not be compensated by the new
target-payoﬀ-vector. If the cost c of buying the first stage in Ik is small enough compared to
the gain at stage tik, then such deviation would be profitable.
6.3. At Least Four Players, Three Actions
For at least four players and three actions, say a, b and c, the construction in our main theorem
could be adapted as follows: Block Uk remains essentially the same, by letting every player
choose a switching stage according to the same probability distribution as in Table 1, at which
he randomizes between the two non-prescribed actions. In Ik the situation changes a bit, since
digit 1 now corresponds to action a and digit 0 corresponds to action b. Hence, the digits no
longer correspond to randomizations over two actions, as before. This is necessary since we only
have three actions, and hence we cannot construct two randomizations with disjoint supports.
In fact, we could also have used this approach for our construction in the main body of the
paper. In Ck, every player i still buys the same information as in Table 1, except for the fact
that he no longer buys Dk−1 (as this block will disappear in the new construction), and player i
no longer buys the switching stage of player i+ 1 (if player i is the last player, he does not buy
player 1’s switching stage). Subsequently, player i either plays a with probability 1 or b with
probability 1, based on the observed actions at the switching stages tjk (j 6= i + 1) and block
Ck−1. Block Dk no longer exists. If a player detects a deviation, then he will buy all previous
stages, finds out the first deviator, and will always play a non-prescribed action at all further
stages, until he notices that all opponents (expect the first deviator) also do so. From that
moment on, the first deviator will be punished.
We need four players here in order to guarantee that a deviation at a non-switching stage
in Uk will be detected with positive probability. Consider, namely, player i who deviates at a
non-switching stage. Then, with positive probability this stage will coincide with player (i−1)’s
switching stage, which will be bought by player i + 1 (since we have at least four players).
Therefore, i’s deviation will be detected with positive probability by player i+ 1.
Notice that by this construction no player is certain about the report to be sent by the
opponents in Ck, since he does not buy all switching stages. Therefore, every player has an
incentive to buy Ck at Ck+1, even though no randomization takes place in Ck. Moreover, every
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player i should report correctly at Ck since any player j 6= i will know after Ck+1 which report
should have been sent by player i at Ck. Namely, player j has observed all switching stages except
the one of player j + 1. When at Ck+1 player j observes the report sent by players j0 /∈ {i, j}
at Ck, then he can deduce the actions played at the switching stage of player j + 1. Therefore,
player j will know the report that should have been sent by player i at Ck.
6.4. Concluding Remarks
1. We wish to mention that the case of two players and two actions for each player is even more
complicated. It is unclear, for instance, whether in the two-player prisoners’ dilemma one can
obtain equilibrium payoﬀs close to the cooperative outcome. We have the feeling that this is
not possible. In any case, one would need a drastically diﬀerent construction than the one we
presented, even if it were possible.
2. In our model, it is crucial that players can buy information about all past stages, and
that players always receive information about the actions of all opponents when purchasing a
stage. The analysis would be significantly diﬀerent if players could only buy information about
the present stage, or could request information from subgroups of opponents.
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